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Abstract
This essay argues that Luther’s “metaphysics” is  present in  Heidegger’s Be-
iträge zur Philosophie (Contributions to Philosophy), a text many consider to be 
Heidegger’s second magnum opus. I argue that Luther’s “metaphysics” is pre-
sent in  Heidegger’s Contributions in  primarily two ways: (1) there is  a  Lu-
theran structure (of existential categories) that Heidegger appropriated not 
only in Being and Time, but also much earlier in his lectures on St. Paul from 
the 1920s, of responding to a call and converting in anxious anticipation to-
ward a futural not-yet (what Heidegger calls “the last god”); and (2) Contribu-
tions’ project concerns overcoming metaphysics, which involves first thinking 
through to metaphysics’ conditions for possibility, which means recognizing 
the “ironic nature” of beyng via what Heidegger calls “thinking concealment,” 
the logic of which originates in Luther’s attacks on not only Greek metaphys-
ics, but upon Judaism and the Mosaic law as well.
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As the title of this essay suggests, I would like to argue that Luther’s 
“metaphysics” is present and at work in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Phi-
losophie (Contributions to Philosophy), a controversial, but important text 
in the Heidegger cannon, a text that many argue is Heidegger’s second 
magnum opus, as it is in this text that nearly every major theme of Hei-
degger’s later philosophy (in and around the Kehre) presents itself, al-
beit at times in inchoate forms. Given the enigma that is Heidegger’s 
Beiträge, I will begin by offering a brief outline of the project of Con-
tributions to  Philosophy, before tying this project explicitly with the 
thinking of Luther. As I begin, one will likely notice how “Lutheran” 
the project is from its inception. The thesis of my essay, however, is as 
follows: Luther’s “metaphysics” is present in Heidegger’s Contributions 
in primarily two ways: (1) there is a Lutheran structure (of existential 
categories), that Heidegger appropriated not only in Being and Time, 
but also much earlier in his lectures on St. Paul from the 1920s (The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life), of responding to a call and converting 
(turning) in anxious anticipation toward a futural not-yet (in Contri-
butions this is what Heidegger calls “the last god”); and (2) Contributions’ 
project concerns overcoming metaphysics, but overcoming metaphys-
ics in such a way that involves first thinking through to metaphysics’ 
conditions for possibility (i.e. deconstructing it)—which means recog-
nizing the “ironic nature” of beyng, via what Heidegger calls “thinking 
concealment,” the logic of which originates in Luther’s attacks on not 
only Greek metaphysics, but upon Judaism and the Mosaic law as well. 
But, first, let me briefly turn to the text of Contributions itself.
Contributions (written 1936 to  1938) was published only relatively 
recently in  German (1989), and then translated into English twice, 
in 1999 and then again in 2012 (this gives you a sense of how impor-
tant it is, or how important it was thought to be, in Heidegger’s work). 
Heidegger asked that it not be published for at least a hundred years 
after his death, for fear of it not being understood (he said perhaps only 
four or five people in  the world could understand it), likely because 
Contributions is highly obscure and enigmatic (even for Heidegger) and 
written in a semi-aphoristic style that jumps from theme to theme with 
seemingly no coherent order, revolving around six “joinings” or “fugues” 
(die Fugen, like the musical fugues), that attempt to say or enact the 
process of overcoming (or deconstructing) metaphysics, a project that, 
as we know, has its roots in Luther and his attack on the relationship 
between Christianity and Hellenic metaphysics. Indeed it is the task 
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of Contributions to somehow phenomenologically enact this overcom-
ing by thinking through metaphysics’ unthought ground or condition 
for possibility, which is none other than “beyng” itself. Thus the think-
ing of metaphysics’ conditions is tantamount to thinking beyng, and yet 
thinking beyng proves impossible for Heidegger, so  long as  the con-
cealed nature of beyng remains unthought. Therefore, in order to think 
beyng, qua truth, as the process of revealing and concealing, or “clearing 
concealing,” attention must be paid to concealment, which itself remains 
concealed, as “concealed concealment,” in metaphysics and metaphysics’ 
various historical instantiations. In order then to “think concealment,” 
beyng itself must be  recognized in  its “ironic” nature; that is, beyng 
must be seen as having a tendency to conceal itself in favor of beings. 
There is  a distance between beyng and how beyng appears. In other 
words, the tension between essence and appearance, the very tension 
that characterizes irony itself (I’m thinking e.g. of Kierkegaard’s treat-
ment of  irony), must be  seen as  inherent in  the beyng/truth process 
of revealing/concealing, in that no single historical “meaning” of being 
is equivalent or identifiable with beyng itself, but rather “beyng” always 
holds back, conceals itself, in every historical revealing. This amounts 
to beyng’s irony, that beyng always hides in order to “illuminate beings.” 
Now this irony is precisely what is missed by metaphysical thinking, 
which began with Plato (in what Heidegger calls the “first beginning”) 
and has now exhausted itself and come to its full fruition and climax 
in  the Nietzschean reversal of Platonism, in  the metaphysics of will 
to power, which understands things as objects to be mastered (“we are 
masters and possessors of  nature” as  Descartes had hoped for). This 
current situation Heidegger calls nihilism, or the “abandonment of be-
ing” in Contributions, and by this nihilism Heidegger means quite sim-
ply the reduction of the meaning of being to one meaning, such that 
beyng itself is concealed in the very reduction. That is, such reduction-
ism is, for Heidegger, contingent upon the failure to recognize beyng 
itself – beyng’s concealment—and thus the failure to recognize, as Ar-
istotle says, that being is said in “many ways,” has multiple meanings, 
and thus simply cannot be reduced to one meaning.
Now strangely enough, for Heidegger, to  admit this is  already 
to  have begun, in  a  sense, to  overcome metaphysics, insofar as  over-
coming metaphysics is  nothing more than uncovering its condi-
tions (this is of course the Kantian element in Heidegger’s thinking). 
That is, once we’ve admitted that metaphysics is a  reductionism that 
Duane Armitage110
misses concealment –that conceals concealment – and fails to  recog-
nize beyng’s irony, we’ve already begun to think past and to transcend 
such a reduction. Heidegger writes, in perhaps one of the most impor-
tant passage of the Beiträge:
The question, what is metaphysics?, already inquires into what is essen-
tial to ‘metaphysics’ in the sense of gaining an initial footing in crossing 
to the other beginning. In other words, the question already asks from 
within this other beginning. What it makes visible in  its determina-
tion of  ‘metaphysics’ is already no  longer metaphysics, but, rather its 
overcoming.1
In other words, to  inquire into metaphysics’ grounds is  already 
to transcend metaphysics to another beginning of post-metaphysical (or, 
meta-metaphysical) thinking. Asking about metaphysics then means 
deconstructing it and discovering beyng and beyng’s self-concealment. 
Overcoming metaphysics and deconstruction then say the same thing, 
in a tautological manner, namely the “thinking of concealment,” or rec-
ognizing beyng’s fundamental irony with regard to itself. Beyng shows 
itself, but hides itself in  its very showing, and if we can “think” this 
hiding, we  can overcome or  “twist free” of metaphysics. As we shall 
see, Heidegger will in Contributions equate the thinking that thinks 
concealment with faith itself.
Yet how does such a  thinking occur? How can the human being 
become “Dasein” and thus think through this current nihilism? (Note: 
in Contributions the human being is no longer Dasein, but must be-
come Dasein in the overcoming of metaphysics). Heidegger answers 
these questions as to “how” this remains possible in the final section 
of  Contributions entitled “the last god.” Here Heidegger describes 
a  process wherein human beings would respond to  the call of  this 
last god, in the form of a hint, that would “echo” out of the concealed 
concealment of  beyng in  metaphysics and enable the human being, 
1 “Die Frage: Was ist Metaphysik?, im  Bereich des Übergangs zum anderen 
Anfang gestellt…, erfragt das Wesen der ‘Metaphysik’ bereits im Sinne einer ersten 
Gewinnung der Vorfeldstellung zum Übergang in den anderen Anfang. Mit anderen 
Worten, sie fragt schon aus diesem her. Was sie als Bestimmung der ‘Metaphysik’ si-
chtbar macht, das ist schon nicht mehr die Metaphysik, sondern ihre Überwindung.” 
M. Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis, Frankfurt 1989, p. 171–172 (Gesa-
mtausgabe, 65); translation mine. 
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in distress (die Not), to enact a necessary turn (Not-wendig) and “leap” 
out of this nihilism into the groundless ground (or abyss) that is the 
concealment of beyng itself. Here Heidegger is rethinking authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit) from Being and Time, in  terms of  the event of beyng 
(Er-eignis, where Heidegger highlights purposefully the word “eigen”). 
Now, in Being and Time, Dasein is called by its conscience to authenti-
cally “own” its own being vis-à-vis das Man, by anticipating in anxiety 
its “ownmost possibility”— death. It seems however that this authen-
ticity structure is simply a “demythologized” version of the very same 
structure used by Heidegger in his early lectures on St. Paul from the 
1920s. That is, in  these Paul lectures Heidegger considers the early 
Christian as one who responds to a call, in distress and anxiety, and 
converts, turns, over and against “the world” (here the analog for das 
Man) and anticipates the futural not-yet of the Parousia of Christ (the 
analog for death). In  Contributions these same existential categories 
(of the authenticity/faith structure) are rethought historically (rather 
than religiously or  purely existentially) and are wedded to  the over-
coming of metaphysics. In Contributions, metaphysics (qua nihilism) 
functions as the inauthenticity of the current age and thus as the analog 
to das Man and the world. The authentic thinking of the event of beyng, 
amounts to responding to the call of the last god, in distress and anxiety, 
and functions as the analog to authenticity and faith. Most importantly, 
the last god functions as  the analog to both the Parousia and death, 
both of  which remain essentially futural and hence must be  antici-
pated in existential anxiety or distress. Thus, the very same existential 
structures that Heidegger first presented in his analysis of primordial 
Christianity remain almost completely intact in his thinking of the last 
god in Contributions. Moreover, in his initial phenomenology of early 
Christian existence, Heidegger sought to  divorce enacted Christian 
existence from a kind of objectivism and dogmatism that he thought 
burdened the (then) current trends in philosophy of  religion. In  the 
same way, Heidegger’s thinking of the last god attempts to divorce it-
self from the onto-theology of metaphysics that seeks to corner God 
into the category of being and ground, where the last god is simply the 
presence of the holy as it appears or manifests itself (i.e. comes to have 
meaning within a world as an open relational context of meaning) out 
of the negative or concealed dimension of existence (being) when and 
only when metaphysics is  overcome by  thinking through the condi-
tions for its possibility.
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So, how are these elements of  the authenticity structure and the 
overcoming of  metaphysics in  Contributions Lutheran; that is, how 
do they display a Lutheran “metaphysics”? Firstly (and obviously) the 
general project of overcoming metaphysics by way of a deconstruction 
of it, as we know, has its roots in Luther’s “deconstruction” of Athens’ 
marriage to Jerusalem, in Luther’s opposing of the “theology of glory” 
by way of a “theology of the cross,” which results in not only an attack 
upon Greek metaphysics (specifically Aristotle), but also upon reason 
(ratio) itself and the very rational categories by  and through which 
we understand things in the world. In general, Luther attacks reason, 
famously characterizing it as the “Devil’s Whore” that must be “slain 
by faith,” largely due to the corruption of reason by the far-reaching 
effects of original sin, which render reason unable to think the invisible 
God apart from idolizing the visible creation. In other words, Luther’s 
attack on reason amounts to, at least in part, an attack on natural theol-
ogy, and thus a  reinterpretation of Romans 1:19–20 (“God’s invisible 
qualities are clearly discerned from what has been made”). Thus, Luther 
argues, quite fideisticly, that one must “kill reason and believe in Christ,” 
and embrace the mystery of God’s absence, God’s abandonment, which 
must be endured in Anfechtung (tribulation, affliction).
However, Luther’s attack on theoretical reason gets much more spe-
cific in his commentary on Romans (specifically v. 8:19), as it attacks 
the very nature of  metaphysical speculation itself, namely ontology, 
temporality, and the doctrine of essences. Luther argues that philoso-
phers in their preoccupation with the quidditative presence of things, 
privilege the temporality of  the present, or  how creatures “are now,” 
over and against that of  the future as  to how things “will be” at  the 
Eschaton. Vis-à-vis this “metaphysics of presence,” Luther advocates 
a “me-ontological negation” of things as they “are” in favor of what they 
“are not” and thus “will be,” in order to shift the focus from creatures “as 
such” toward what creatures “wait for.” Luther writes,
[L]earn from the apostle to consider the whole creature as it waits, 
groans, and travails in pain, i.e., as it turns with disgust from what 
now is and yearns for what is  to come. Then the science of  the es-
sence of things and of their accidental qualities and differences will 
soon become worthless…anyone who searches into the essences 
and functionings of  the creatures rather than into their sighings 
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and earnest expectations is  certainly foolish and blind.” (Romans, 
236–237).2
Luther thus argues for what he  calls, later in  that same passage, 
“tensed hoping” over “theoretical speculation.” Indeed, Luther translates 
apokaradokia (from Romans 8:19, “the creation waits in eager expectation 
for the sons of God to be revealed”) as ängstliche Harren, i.e. anxious 
waiting or  anticipation. Luther’s anti-metaphysical posture thus ad-
vocates a meontological or negative futural comportment of anxious 
anticipation towards beings and towards God.
Now from a  quick glance, Lutheran themes such as  the critique 
of metaphysics and of natural theology, the privileging of  the future 
over the present, and the emphasis upon anxiety and anticipation, all 
appear to be fairly explicit not only in Contributions, but also through-
out most of the Heideggerian corpus. As we have seen, Contributions’ 
focus is upon the overcoming of the metaphysical conception of being 
(as of course Beingness or presence), and awaiting, in distress and anxiety, 
the last god as-to-come. Indeed, the futural last god is the messianic 
itself, whose coming is contingent upon the recognition of the conceal-
ment of beyng itself. Such a comportment of anticipation, in anxiety, 
towards a futural not-yet within the context of an overcoming of meta-
physics is  clearly reminiscent of  Luther’s commentary on  Romans. 
Moreover, although not explicit, much of  Contributions anticipates 
Heidegger’s later critique of  onto-theology, which argues that “God” 
is  blasphemed so  long as  God is  thought through the causal-nexus 
of ratio with its categories of substance and causality. That is, for Hei-
degger, once beings are conceived as substances within a causal nexus, 
ipso facto this nexus leads (in order to avoid infinite regress) to a  ter-
minus, in  an unconditioned cause, that is  simultaneously substantive 
in the highest sense. In other words, the conceiving of beings under the 
rational, metaphysical categories of cause and substance always leads 
to the eventuality of the Scholastic hierarchy and/or analogy of being, 
where beings are caused by the highest cause, God, which Heidegger, 
like Luther, considered blasphemous. Heidegger’s onto-theological cri-
tique then demands an assault upon reason (in terms of its metaphysical 
blasphemy in the analogy of being) and thus reposes the famous Tertul-
lian question concerning Athens’ relationship to Jerusalem, or reason’s 
2 M. Luther, Lectures on Romans, Philadelphia 1961, p. 236–237.
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relationship to faith. Heidegger of course does not go so far as to call 
reason the “devil’s whore;” however, Heidegger does, like Luther, direct 
this critique precisely at reason itself (and the doctrine of analogy), and 
in  turn posits a  conception of God that remains hidden and absent, 
always futural, and one that must be endured in distress and anxiety 
(or we could say in Anfechtung). The last god, as the Deus Absconditus, 
avoids, perhaps fideistically, the rational pitfalls of metaphysics and its 
blasphemous God “of the philosophers,” by showing itself as concealed, 
and moreover, showing itself only in  tandem with metaphysics’ de-
construction, or with the thinking of concealment that thinks through 
metaphysics’ own conditions for possibility. It  is to  this simultaneity 
between the last god and the deconstruction of metaphysics that I’ll 
now turn. (It is worth noting parenthetically that since I believe that 
Heidegger’s onto-theological critique is fully a result of this “Lutheran 
logic,” and since so much of current postmodern, Continental philoso-
phy of  religion simply presupposes Heidegger’s onto-theological cri-
tique, I have therefore argued elsewhere that all postmodern theology 
or philosophy of religion is fundamentally Lutheran).3
The decisive Lutheran element of Heidegger’s Beiträge is not simply 
the last god, but the last god occurring in tandem with the overcoming 
of metaphysics and the fundamental comportment of the human being 
towards reality, which I argue, is fundamentally an  ironic posture that 
Heidegger usurps from the logic of Luther. As said above, the last god 
is  wholly wedded, for Heidegger, to  the overcoming of  metaphysics, 
so much so that Heidegger even says explicitly that the last god is the 
overcoming, is the “other beginning” beyond metaphysics. Thus this di-
sentanglement of God from ratio proves essential for Heidegger, as it 
did for Luther, in order for authentic faith to occur. As I noted earlier, 
the primary aim of Heidegger’s Contributions is to “think concealment” 
so as to overcome metaphysics, which involves a recognition of beyng’s 
own irony, i.e. its ironic withdrawal with regard to its historic instan-
ces. Moreover, Heidegger calls the comportment towards this ironic 
concealment of beyng nothing other than “faith,” and thus it  is here 
that Heidegger’s deepest connections to Luther, in Contributions, come 
to the fore.
3 See D.  Armitage, Heidegger’s Pauline and Lutheran Roots, New York 2016, 
p. 153–167.
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Heidegger argues, toward the end of Contributions, that the essence 
of  faith must be  grasped “on the basis of  the essence of  truth” and 
distinguishes between two aspects of  faith: on  the one hand, a  faith 
that holds or believes what is true, e.g. the assent to some creedal for-
mula, and on the other hand, a more original faith that holds to truth 
itself, and not merely to what is true.4 That is, true faith is synonymous 
with what Heidegger calls an  “essential knowing” that stands in  the 
truth of beyng itself, which is nothing more than to recognize the con-
cealment of truth itself, or the concealing in the “clearing-concealing.” 
Heidegger writes,
If the essence of truth is the clearing [Lichtung] for the self-concealing 
of beyng, then knowledge [qua faith] is an abiding in this clearing [or 
revealing] of  concealment and is  thus the basic relation of  the self-
concealing of beyng and to beyng itself.5
Faith stands from within the essence of truth, that is, from within the 
negative, concealing dimension of truth and thus to the self-concealing 
of beyng itself. Yet, to stand from within concealment and to think such 
concealment, is already, as we have seen, to have overcome metaphysics 
(insofar as metaphysical thinking missed this very concealment). Thus, 
such faith, which abides in the “clearing concealment,” harkens to and 
recognizes truth/beyng’s self-effacing irony in metaphysics, and thus 
allows for the overcoming and self-destruction of metaphysics. That is, 
metaphysics by way of metaphysics, is destroyed, insofar as metaphysics 
is seen in its truth, namely as an (ironic) showing of beyng. Faith thus 
enables metaphysics to be transcended by way of  itself, when its con-
ditions are recognized; metaphysics therefore dismantles itself by way 
of  the posture of  faith (that recognizes beyng’s own irony). In other 
words, faith transcends (and thus negates) metaphysics, by  recogniz-
ing precisely what was held back and concealed in  it, namely beyng 
itself; this transcendental negation is  tantamount to  the recognition 
of beyng’s ironic withdrawal.
Now in Luther we see this same fundamental, ironic posture of fa-
ith, in his doctrine of sola fide, where faith is contingent upon first a re-
cognition of what Kierkegaard later calls “the irony of the law,” namely 
4 M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, Bloomington 2012, p. 291.
5 M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, op. cit., p. 292.
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that the Mosaic law, in all that it commands, commands ironically, in that 
it commands what no one can fulfill, and moreover actually incites one 
under the law to do the opposite (as St. Paul says “I did not know what 
it was to covet until the commandment came, and then sin came alive 
and I died” (Romans 7:7–9)). If irony is characterized by a distance and 
difference between essence and appearance, where, in this tension, ap-
pearance reveals not its essence but the opposite thereof, then the law 
proves ironic in that while its end (telos) is to make a person good, what 
results from it is the opposite, namely sin and death. A necessary com-
ponent and step in “saving faith” involves, for Luther, then a recogni-
tion of the Mosaic law’s own self-destruction in its own irony. Once one 
recognizes the impossibility of  fulfilling the law, then and only then 
can saving faith enter as one confronts one’s own impotence before the 
law. Luther writes,
…[T]he commandments show us what we ought to do but do not give 
us the power to do it. They are intended to teach man to know him-
self, that through them he may recognize his inability to do good and 
may despair of his own ability…when a man has learned through the 
commandments to recognize his helplessness and is distressed about 
how he might satisfy the law…then being truly humbled and reduced 
to nothing in his own eyes, he finds in himself nothing whereby he may 
be justified and saved….this is the first power of faith.6
The law thus begins to destroy itself the moment it is taken seriously. 
One only has to attempt to fulfill the law to recognize the irony that 
the law cannot and can’t ever be  fulfilled. The law therefore self-de-
structs. Faith’s requisite then is a deconstruction of the law, in that faith 
first requires a comportment toward the law that allows for the law’s 
own destruction through a recognition of its own irony. Such a concep-
tion of faith is mirrored in Heidegger’s Contributions insofar as faith 
is precisely the fundamental ironic posture of negation that allows for 
metaphysics’ own self-deconstruction and unraveling precisely by the 
recognition of its own irony, namely the irony of beyng. Moreover, this 
ironic posture also results in a negating of what is in favor of what is to 
come, which must be awaited and endured in anxiety and distress. Again, 
6 M. Luther, Selections from His Writings, ed. by J. Dillenberger, New York 1962, 
p. 57–59.
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Kierkegaard’s conception of  irony (as fundamentally an act of decon-
struction by way of negation) can help mediate here: for Kierkegaard, 
the ironist negates or destroys the given actuality by the given actuality 
itself; that is, the ironist negates by letting the given reality self-destruct 
or deconstruct itself by finding within actuality the seeds of its own de-
mise, which means the ironist does not advance the new so much as en-
able the old to  be perceived in  its incompleteness and imperfection, 
and thus the given actuality loses its validity and meaning. Kierkegaard 
of course assumes the Hegelian dialectic of history, where the Idea be-
comes more and more actual through various dialectical movements – 
of the coming of the new and the displacement of the old. The ironist 
applies to  the latter, as his role is  to displace and negate the current 
actuality, without however aiding or even knowing of what is to come. 
Irony is thus simultaneously an act of negating and awaiting. This maps 
onto the ironic postures of Luther and Heidegger, where the law and 
metaphysics lose their validity and are displaced once their truth is rec-
ognized, and the new, which is to come, is anticipated. In other words, 
Kierkegaard shows that the activity of deconstruction is precisely the 
same activity of irony, i.e. the recognition that something is “held back” 
that cannot be thought or even found, but only awaited.
The overcoming of  reason and Greek metaphysics, as well as  the 
Mosaic law, through an ironic, deconstructive comportment that would 
negate “what is” in favor of “what is to come” in the tensed hope of anx-
ious anticipation, is thus what unites Heidegger’s Beiträge to Luther’s 
“metaphysics.” Heidegger’s “Lutheran roots” are then not simply the 
structural similarities of anxiety and distress in anticipation of the mes-
sianic, but also the fact that such structural similarities occur within 
the context of  simultaneously deconstructing metaphysics (and Juda-
ism) so as to enable the ironic and anticipatory nature of  faith itself. 
Heidegger’s use of Luther’s existential categories and deconstructive 
aim makes it  difficult to  interpret the “logic” to  Heidegger’s “theol-
ogy” in Contributions, as well as his later philosophy, as anything other 
than “Christian,” and thus seems to situate Heidegger’s project, at least 
theologically, within the Reformational thinking that attempts, like 
Kierkegaard and Kant, to delimit reason in order to make room for 
faith. However, any deconstruction of rationality, whether in in favor 
of saving faith or phenomenological “faith” qua Denken, nevertheless 
may lead not only to a deconstruction of reason, but to a destruction of it 
as well. This destruction of reason results in the common charge against 
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Luther (and against Kierkegaard) of fideism. That is, any deconstruction 
of  reason presupposes the very thing it attempts to deconstruct, and 
would then deconstruct itself as well, self-referentially, insofar as even 
descriptive phenomenology and/or faith hermeneutics presupposes the 
very rational categories (of “cause,” “substance,” etc.) that would remain 
dismantled and rendered inert by the deconstruction. The question re-
mains as to whether Luther’s (and Heidegger’s) critique of metaphysics 
and reason can exempt itself from its own critique, or  inadvertently 
destroys even its own claims to  truth by  deconstructing truth’s very 
condition(s) for possibility, namely rationality itself.
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